Differentiating Criminal Responsibility in Offenses Against Life and Health: Problems of Qualification and Complicity

Abstract

Crimes against life and health represent the most socially dangerous category of offenses in criminal law, as they directly affect the fundamental and irreplaceable value of human existence. Despite the priority accorded to the protection of life, practical and doctrinal difficulties continue to arise in the differentiation of criminal liability for such crimes, particularly in cases involving complicity and special subjects. This article examines the problems of differentiating liability for crimes against life and health through the analysis of the objective element of the offense, the forms of perpetration, and the legal status of participants involved in criminal activity. Special attention is paid to issues of co-perpetration, instigation, and aiding, as well as to crimes committed by special subjects, including the intentional killing of a newborn by the mother. The study also addresses contemporary challenges related to surrogate motherhood and the determination of criminal liability in the context of modern medical technologies. Based on an analysis of criminal legislation, legal doctrine, and judicial practice, the article identifies gaps and inconsistencies in the qualification of participants’ actions. The findings emphasize the importance of a differentiated approach to criminal liability as a means of ensuring justice, legal certainty, and the correct application of criminal law norms.